Over the past decade, clear evidence has been produced showing that effective constituency campaigning in British general elections can lead to better electoral performance. This evidence has challenged the received wisdom that only national campaigning is significant and that efforts at local level are meaningless rituals. Denver et al have focused on the role of the national parties in strengthening local campaigns in target seats; Seyd & Whiteley, by contrast, have stressed the importance of local party membership. This article attempts to assess the relative electoral impact of national party co-ordination and constituency party membership and suggests that the impact of these two factors varies by party.
Introduction
Over the past decade, the role and impact of constituency campaigning in British States (see, for example : Crotty, 1971; Jacobson, 1980 Jacobson, , 1990 but have also challenged what was previously the received wisdom put forward, for example, by various 'Nuffield' studies -that only national campaigning is significant and that efforts at local level are meaningless rituals -and what was once a 'revisionist' position has now come to be widely accepted. That said, there have been differences between the three teams, not only in methodology but also in their conclusions about whether local campaigning 'works' for all of the major parties. Originally at least, both Seyd & Whiteley and Johnston & Pattie argued that the constituency campaigns of all three parties had a significant impact (see, for example Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Pattie, Johnston, et al., 1995) . Denver & Hands (1997 , 2002 on the other hand, have suggested that constituency campaigning by the Conservatives has been notably less effective than campaigning by Labour or the Liberal Democrats: their analyses show no discernible effect of Conservative constituency campaigning in 1992 and 1997 and, at best, a small effect in 2001.
A more significant disagreement has concerned which aspects of constituency campaigning are more important in affecting election outcomes. To a large extent, Seyd & Whiteley's work on campaigning has been a by-product of their groundbreaking studies of party membership and they have used an index of membership activism in constituencies to demonstrate the effectiveness of local campaigns.
Perhaps partly for this reason, they have stressed the importance of party membership. As they make clear, their index of activism -which is their measure of campaign intensity -scores more highly the more constituency members a party has:
'a given constituency party could obtain a high intensity score either by having a large number of members who are moderately active, or by having a few members who are highly active' (Whiteley and Seyd, 2003, p. 310) . In contrast, Denver & Hands have assigned an increasingly important role to the activities of central professional party staff in co-ordinating constituency campaigns as a whole, focusing resources on key constituencies and modernising campaign organisation at the local level. Of course, both the size of party memberships and increased influence from the centre are likely to be of significance: good campaigns cannot be run without a substantial voluntary input from members on the ground and the substantially greater resources available to the central party organisations clearly give them the potential to have a major impact on local campaigning. In this article, however, we seek to make some assessment of their relative significance: which makes the greater contribution to improved electoral performance at the constituency level?
In general, the various components of campaigning are closely related, and disaggregating their effects is not an easy matter. However the nature of the data collected by Denver & Hands at the general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2001, on the basis of surveys of election agents and organisers, allows us to construct measures of the extent to which the national party organisations have sought to exercise central involvement in different constituencies, as well as providing reliable estimates of constituency party memberships.
1 Furthermore, it is clear that these two components of campaigning are not directly related. We present more evidence on this below, but there is no reason to believe that the constituencies that the national parties seek to target will have high levels of party membership or vice versa. Thus we should be able to provide some assessment of the relative importance of central party influence and local membership using fairly standard statistical techniques. It is necessary first of all, however, to say rather more about the influence of the central party organisations and how we propose to measure it.
Developing a measure of central party influence
We have a straightforward measure of constituency party membership. In all three surveys conducted by Denver and Hands, election agents were asked to give an estimate of their local membership at the time of the election -something that they were normally in a good position to be able to do. Comparisons with estimates of membership from other sources suggest that these data are reliable (Fisher, 2000) . Nationalist respondents, of course, would be certain to do so, not having 'regional' organisations equivalent to those of the other parties.
Are we measuring different things?
Before attempting to assess the impact of central involvement and local membership on electoral performance, we first need to explore the relationship between our two variables and make sure that they are not simply replicating the more complete index of local campaign intensity used in previous analyses (Denver et al, 2003) . In other words, we need to make sure that we are not using apparently different variables to measure overall campaign intensity. To form a judgement about this, we begin by correlating the measures of central involvement and local membership with the full campaign index for each party in each election. The results are shown in Table 1 Liberal Democrat headquarters has grown, the party simply lacks the resources to do very much more than encourage constituency campaigners from the centre.
[ Table 3 About Here]
We would expect, however, that central involvement would be greatest in key seats rather than in those safely held or unlikely to be won. As with the overall measure of campaign intensity, what matters is whether the resources and effort are distributed effectively across different types of seat -i.e. with most resources concentrated on target seats. Previous studies (Denver & Hands, 1997) have shown, for example, that although the Conservatives had very strong constituency campaigns overall in 1992, their strongest campaigns were in their safest seats. Of course, parties only have limited control over how intense the campaigns are in particular constituenciesmembership levels, for example, often reflect previous electoral success (Fisher, 2000; Fisher et al, 2006) . In theory at least, they have much greater control over the targeting of their involvement in local campaigns. The data in Table 4 show the extent to which the parties have been effective in this respect.
In [ Table 4 About Here]
For the sake of comparison, we show in Table 5 the distribution of party members between target and non-target seats. There is not a lot that parties can do centrally to affect these figures, which are more likely to be a product of local contexts, but the data enable us to indicate the extent to which party members are distributed Table 2 showed that strong Liberal Democrat campaigns are heavily dependent on high membership levels, yet the party's mean membership level in 'not held not target' seats is relatively small.
[ Table 5 About Here]
The Electoral Impact
We now return to the central concern of this article -the relative electoral impact of central party involvement and party membership. We return to the original index scores and use straightforward methods to explore this question, starting with simple bivariate correlations. We have argued elsewhere that the most suitable measure of party performance in this context is change in share of the electorate won between two elections (Denver et al, 2002; . However, because of boundary changes it is not possible to calculate change in share of the electorate figures for 1997, and we also report, therefore, analyses based on change in share of the vote in the three elections.
[ Table 6 About Here]
The correlation coefficients reported in Table 6 [ Table 7 About Here]
The most economical and widely used 5 way to control for the socio-economic composition of constituencies is to use share of the vote or electorate at the relevant election as the dependent variable (rather than change in share) and share of the vote or electorate at the previous election as a control variable. This effectively controls for a range of socio-economic variables associated with variations in party support across constituencies. Table 7 reports partial correlations on this basis. As can be seen, the relationships between the central involvement index and Conservative performance remain non-significant. In the case of the Liberal Democrats, the coefficients are generally somewhat stronger than in Table 6 and, in particular, the relationships between performance and both independent variables are now positive and significant. For Labour, all measures now suggest that central involvement had a positive impact on performance in 2001. On the other hand, the relationships between membership and performance in 2001 remain negative.
Finally, in The data were analysed using stepwise multiple regression and, for each party at each election, with central involvement and membership being the key predictor variables. It is worth noting that these are stiff tests of the impact of the two independent variables as the control variables alone produce very large r-squared figures.
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[ Table 8 About Here]
The variables reported in Table 8 are logarithms (as in Table 2 
Conclusion
It must be stressed again that the index of central involvement that we have used here cannot entirely capture all the features of increased central influence that we have described elsewhere using qualitative analysis (Denver et al, 2003) .
Nonetheless, it is useful and tends to corroborate the argument that in all three However, their assertion that large numbers of moderately active members will deliver as many electoral benefits as a small number of very active one seems contestable on the basis of these findings. Instead, they reinforce the view expressed elsewhere (Denver & Hands, 2004) that, certainly in the case of the Labour party, the crucial factor leading to more effective local campaigning has been the role played by the party's central organisation in encouraging and helping to modernise campaigning in the key constituencies. 3. This is preferable to using a simple additive scale, since such scales treat all components equally in the calculation of the index.
4. This adjustment involves multiplying the factor score by 33.3 and then adding 100.
5.
The use of a lagged variable creates a dynamic specification of the model, which controls for the effects of the independent variables at the previous election. See, for example Whiteley & Seyd, 1998, p.123. 6 . Region was analysed by a series of dummy variables for each of the standard regions in England with the West Midlands omitted as the comparator. Incumbency was also measured as a dummy variable.
7.
Although the data are pooled to produce comparable centralisation index scores, it is necessary to run the models on an 'election by election' basis, rather that using interaction terms, as the dependent variable for 1997 (share of vote) differs from that of 1992 and 2001 (share of the electorate) because of boundary changes. 
